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Abstract
There have been tendencies in various fields to use cOTInmmication as a way of
differentiating humans and other species. Even when individuals are confronted with
empirical evidence to the contrary, many still hold onto the notion that humans are in a
communicative position clearly divergent in all ways from animals. This thesis will
utilize Kenneth Burke's "Definition of Man" as a launching point to support a claim that
animals utilize their conscious cognitive abilities to communicate symbolically.
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Undefining Man
A Case for Symbolic Animal Communication via Refutation of Kenneth Burke's
"Definition of Man"

Introduction
I wasn't twenty feet down the path that encircles Pennsylvania's Lake Scranton
before I was halted in my tracks by the sight of the animal that was a few yards away.
Now, most stories that begin as such will usually proceed to explain one of two sorts of
animals - either a grand and majestic rarity or a fierce and dangerous predator. TIns
animal, however, was neither. It was an Eastern Gray Squirrel, but that is really not the
point of the story. I quietly proceeded down the path and began making tschih tschih

tschih noises, hoping to establish contact with the wild wonder. The animal seemed to
notice my noises for a brief moment, a moment in which I held my breath in hope of
communicating with the small bundle of intrigue, but the brief moment was truly that brief. The squirrel then went on with its foraging in the dirt for its cache until another
squirrel aloft in the trees called out in a loud chirp, knock. This time, the squirrel
responded to the sound quite poignantly, dashing into a nearby fir tree, staying still, thus
blending in with the gray and brown bark patterns. It became apparent that my silly
attempts were not enough to cross the language barrier, but clearly there had been
sometlllng said between the two squirrels that caused the squirrel to react as such. What
was it that was said? More fundamentally, what is the nature of animal communication?
Over the years, various theorists, largely found in the coves of rhetoricians, have
postulated that our symbolic form of commlmication is one that separates us from the rest
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of the animal world. Individuals from Cicero to Isocrates have argued that human
communication is unique and that animals simply do not operate on the same plane as
humans. Kenneth Burke, in his book Language as Symbolic Action (1996), puts forth his
"Definition of Man." The definition differentiates humanity from the animal kingdom
via unique attributes in commlmication, namely symbolic communication. That
communication, however, is not truly as unique and exclusive as Burke would like to
maintain. Animals also communicate symbolically and do so with conscious and
cognitive capacities of varying degrees. Thus, this thesis will argue that Burke's
definition is not exclusive, but rather communication differences are at best differences in
degrees between animals, for animals consciously symbolically communicate.
Literature Review
In order to examine the relationship between animals and communication, we will
need to have a theoretical grounding for what our conceptions truly are. In Language as
Symbolic Action, Burke's work on the "Definition of Man" argues for human
communication as a uniquely human attribute, set apart from animal uses of
communication. His argument that "Man is the symbol using animal" (3) provides us
with a countering point to the observational data concerning animal uses of
communication.
Various communication sources provide a backdrop and support for the analysis
of Burke's "Definition of Man." Greig Henderson argues that Burke's view of symbolusing humans inherently sets up a duality in which humans can only communicate via
symbols, not actually communicating the essence of which they speak (564-569).
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Jeffrey Murray's work interpreting Burke's definition brings forth the claim that
Burke's definition is agent-centered - focusing on the human action that takes place in the
communication process, i.e. making, using, and misusing symbols, etc., within the duality
(29-33). This focus allows us to then look at how animals communicate from an agentcentered perspective as well.
The use of the symbols, however, can be seen as an action. In How to Do Things
With Words, J. L. Austin's work on language as action, Austin claims that when an
individual speaks, he or she is not only symbolically representing something, but rather
the utterance is a performative action (6). For instance, in a wedding ceremony, the
phrase "I do" contains a contractual and promissory essence that is established through
the utterance. The phrase is not merely simple representation, but rather an act. Austin
intends to say that humans do something when they communicate. He divides the
categories that statements fall in into three possibilities - "locutionary," "illocutionary,"
and "perlocutionary" acts (97-101). Locutionary acts are the acts of uttering words that
one knows to have meaning. This act merely contains the rhetic act, which is the act of
sense and reference. The illocutionary act is the doing of something by saying
something, such as the promissory "I do." It is the "pelformance of an act in saying
something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something" (99-100).
Perlocutionary acts are instances when individuals not only say something, but by design
say something and bring about specific effects on the hearer. The effects may be on
belief, attitude, or behavior. An individual may persuade another, for instance, to do
something differently (107). Any given perspective/category can be applied when
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looking at any particular communicative act, and each speech act has the potentiality for
fulfilling each category. This perspective win provide us the foundation for investigating
whether animals do something when they communicate.
The discussion begs the question of the use of symbols. The defmition of signs
and symbols are brought to light by works such as that of Saussure. A sign is something
that points to something beyond itself. Words are the most common of these signs.
Words can be constructed vocally as phonemes, which is a compilation of particular
possible sounds produced by the vocal chords. These signs are broken into two parts, the
signifier and the signified. The signifier is the representation, the word itself. The
signified is the conception of what is being referred to, the object itself. Signs to
Saussure are conventional in that they are decided to have meaning only because that
consensus has been reached among those involved (65-78). Morphemes are
constructions of phomenes. Morphemes are thus words, and these words can be
combined in larger thought units to form larger semiotic units. Semiosis is the
arrangement of morphemes into a larger unit of sense. When there is a large arrangement
of semiotic units, discourse is definitionaHy the result. A discourse consists of a
vocabulary, and a system of meaning and utilization within a group.
We now come to the contextual evidence specific to animals. In When Elephants
Weep, Jeffrey Masson argues that animals exhibit behaviors and tendencies that do not
fall within the normal conception of "instinct," the action of an animal to act
automatically in a manner consistent with a survival mentality (xxii - xxiii). Masson
gives observational examples to justify his claim that animals exist apart from a strict
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instinctual life. The core of the examples rely on field study of animals acting in mm1l1ers
that either jeopardize their own survival seemingly knowingly or in mmmers that simply
have nothing to do with survival. The first set of survival jeopardy includes instances
such as elephants who return to fallen elephants in times of distress in order to assist the
fallen elephant, regardless of the known danger. Other exan1ples include chimpm1Zees
that mourn the loss of family members until the point of death (91-97).
The second set of animal behaviors that seem unrelated to survival involves what
one might consider "fun" in a truly anthropomorphic sense. Exmnpies include crows that
slide on the onion domes of the Kremlin for no known reason, buffalo that spend time
skating across ice, and lemurs that simply bask in the sun (122-129).
While Masson realizes that there is a theoretical possibility that we simply are
unaware of the survival necessity of these activities, it seems likely to him that there is no
immediate connection. He utilizes these exmnples not to make strict, hard truth claims
regarding the nature of animals, but rather to counteract the equally speculative argument
that animals are merely robotic creatures operating out of a priori instinct (15-23). This
basis will be essential for our study of animal communication, as the state of animal
affairs will need to be understood properly in order to establish correctly a paradigm
through which to evaluate their communication.
Many works will also be exmnined that speak toward the communicative
capacities of animals. In varying degrees, these works contend that animals do
cOl11l11unicate with one another. Bradbury's Principles of Animal Communications
creates the groundwork for animal communication, pointing to the fact that animals use
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various systems of signals in order to convey messages of sorts to other animals. These
signals may be in many forms, be they acoustic, chemical, etc. and may communicate
messages relating to predatory danger, foraging location, or breeding (1-10).
Communication is also discussed in other works, such as in Tim Friend's Animal Talk,
where he attempts to decode the various language usages that animals employ (1-32).
The work Animal Vocal Communication by Donald Owings takes the concept of
animal freedom, along with animal commlmication, and applies it to the commlmicative
relationship that animals exhibit between and amongst themselves. He argues that
animals act as managers and use communication to get other animals to act in ways that
are beneficial to the managing animal. The counterpart to the manager is the assessor,
which mayor may not act in accordance with the manager's interest. The interaction
between the manager and the assessor thus creates communication situations more
complex than one would initially realize (48-58). This will provide insight into how
animal communication relates to our conceptions of human communication. Works such
as Eloquent Animals by Flora Davis and Communication in the Animal World by
William Evans will give specific instances of the communicative capabilities of animals.
Additionally, works will be used that establish cognitive abilities of animals.
These works include Principles of Animal Cognitition by William Roberts and Through
our Eyes Only? by Marian Dawkins. These works contend that animals are conscious
and have cognitive abilities beyond much of the levels ascribed to them by individuals of
the human species.
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Main Body
The discussion of rhetoric presupposes and rests upon various facts and
assumptions about communication. We will thus endeavor to unearth various aspects of
communication. In particular, in order to maintain the point that animals communicate
symbolicaily and do so with conscious and cognitive capacities of varying degrees, we
will examine Burke's first clause in his "Definition of Man" - "Man is the symbol using
animal."
The first word used in this clause is "man". This term is one that seems to
casually denote the human existence - homo sapien sapien. (While various scholars and
social traditions have rejected or affirmed the gender biased possibility of the term
"Man", we will interpret this term as referring to humankind in an unbiased manner and
maintain its use in order to maintain the straightforward rearticulation of Burke to refute
him properly.) This term is intended to isolate this species from all other biological life
forms that fall under the animal kingdom.
The second word is the verb "is". This is the present tense of the being verb and
thus denotes a current existence of Man in regards to the definition.
The third word is "the". This word is grammatically a definite ruiicle. The use of
the word ''the'' is a definite and specific clarification that points to exclusivity.

~t

is

important to note that Burke did not choose the word "a" but rather chose "the" so as to
make his definition exclusive of the rest of animals.
The fourth word we encounter is "symbol". This word by dictionary definition
means "something that represents something else by association, resemblance, or
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convention" ("Symbol"). It calls to mind the writings of the individual that took the first
true plunge into semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure creates his distinction
between sign, signified and signifier. The signified is the concept being called to
reference. The signifier is the object, sound, or markation that is used to call up the
concept. The sign is the combination of the two. A symbol, be it a particular word,
language, etc., is a sign with motivation behind it (64-68). It can thus be attributed to
Burke's use of "symbol" that the symbols that Man uses are objects, sOlmds, markations,
etc. used with the motivation of calling up a certain concept.
"Using" is the fifth word used in clause number one of Burke's "Definition of
Man." This term simply refers to the servicing or utilization of something. Thus, Man
does something with symbols.
"Animal" is the final word in this

clause~

It generally refers to those classified

within the kingdom animalia, as opposed to non-living organisms or living organisms
that fall under the kingdom plantae.
With a proper understanding of this first clause in mind, we will now refute the
exclusivity of Burke's first premise. The core of refutation relies on Burke's use of the
term "the". This term's denotation of exclusivity is a necessary part of the definition, but
is nonetheless false. Thus, here we must establish that animals other than Man use
symbols.
Two issues must be addressed in order to refute the exclusiveness. The first is
that animals and symbols occur in relation to each other, that is to say that what an animal
does is symbolic at certain points. However, to make this truly a refutation of the first
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clause, we must address the second issue, which is the use of symbols. It is not merely
enough to say that animals engage in symbolic interactions with one another, but rather
that they are symbol using creatures. We will thus now attempt to explain enough
concerning animals to answer these two issues. The first premise we must conquer is the
symbolic nature of animal interaction.
The concept that animals communicate is one to which most people will adhere
(Bradbury 6). Wolves howl at the pack, rattlesnakes jitter their tails, and birds sing to
one another. These are aspects of nature that almost anyone will accept. Those that do
not believe that animals communicate in any sense (i.e., that they do something to
communicate some sort of message to another animal, have either a very interesting
perspective on the nature of this world, a very strict view of communication, or simply no
knowledge of the existence of animals). In any regards, hopefully the discussion of
symbolic communication will be enough to convince one of communication in general.
The claim that animals communicate symbolically is perhaps a tautological statement in
that communication is inherently symbolic unless the sender can transmit the actual
object or concept to the receiver via communication (Henderson). Once the claim that
animals communicate is established, it thus follows that the animals communicate
symbolically.
We win explore many examples of communicative situations in nature to
elucidate on the symbolic nature of animal communication. Burke himself utilizes an
example of his experience with nature, where a bird seemingly missed what seemed
obvious to Burke, in order to prove his point. Nonetheless, it only seems possible to
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prove the arguments of this thesis via example, as no theoretical discussion that I am
aware of can prove in one direction or another the nature of animal existence, let alone
their comrmmicative experiences.
Birds are a good place to begin in our study of animal commlmication, as the
existence of "bird songs" is commonly acknowledged. Individuals study bird calls, even
to the point that there is a market for tools that can replicate the sounds created by various
species. Birds, such as the hooded warbler can be found making noises such as chipps
and chinks at various times of the year (Owings 4). Blackbirds give warning seeee calls
(Evans 81). Essentially all birds communicate, and much of this communication is via
sound. Whether this sound is symbolic, however, needs be addressed in order to truly
refute Burke's first clause.
Regarding the symbolicity of communication, two points can address the
question. The first point was stated briefly before, that communication itself requires the
use of symbols. Outside the ability simply to share thoughts in their mental state,
creatures must use something as a representative. This other foml embodies a
representation of the thought and thus calls to mind the concept one wishes to
communicate (i.e., this other form is a symbol). Sound is the form that we discuss here.
The sounds birds make are the medium by which these animals can communicate (this
does not, however, negate the fact that there are ways in which birds and other animals
commlmicate aside from auditory communication). Ifwe agree that bird sOlmds
commlmicate ideas via sound representations, we agree that bird sounds are inherently
symbolic.
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Secondly, ifthe first point is too definitional in its approach, we can use various
empirical cases to point towards the symbolic nature of bird sounds. Calls seem to have
various fixed meanings or uses. The male hooded warbler will produce chipps and weeta
weeta weTEEoo sounds when in the nesting/breeding phase, as competition for breeding
tenitory is continued between males. When the female enters, males can be heard then
mixing specific additional songs into the loop. When intruders come near nesting young,
parents will be heard making high-pitched chinks (Owings 5-6). Calls of starlings are
distinct when in the context of distress or danger. The result of such calls is the flock's
departure. These calls have even been recorded so as to be a detractor of starlings in
areas where starlings are a nuisance to humans (Evans 80). The blackbirds produce a
distinct seeee noise only when a predator or other danger confronts the flock from
overhead. A chuck sound is used when predation is a threat from the ground (81). The
sounds are all used in specific contexts. It seems reasonable to say that sOlmds used by
birds in specific contexts are thus for specific purposes and thus contain specific
messages. Therefore, the bird songs would be symbolic.
Birds, however, are not the only animals that interact symbolically. Underwater
mammals produce distinct noises that elicit distinct responses. For instance, killer whales
emit specific noises that cause gray whales to flee (Davis 142). Not only are sOlmds
emitted by aquatic mammals in certain contexts, but underwater mammals have the
capacity to decode various sounds and respond accordingly. Dwight W. Batteau created
an electronic device that took human speech and transmuted it into whistle patterns.
Various formulaic instmctions were then contrived using a vocabulary of whistled words

Undefining Man 15
created by Batteau's speaking into the machine. Commands such as "hit-ball-withflipper" were taught to the porpoises being trained via reward methods (Davis 148).
While this was not an instance of intra-species commlmication, it at least points to the
capacity for aquatic animals to recognize noises as symbolizing specific desired action
and thus seems to point towards an inductively sOlmd arglunent that the innumerable
noises that aquatic mammals make around and to each other contain symbolic meaning.
It makes sense then that aquatic mammals also participate in symbolic commlmication,

for according to Evans, "the entire life of the whale is intimately bound up with [its]
ability to perceive and produce sOlmds" (126).
Our final examples of symbolic interaction rests on a profound example of the
capacity to engage symbolically. This example is that of primates. Vervet monkeys
make distinct noises as alarm calls dependent upon which predator is present: "Short,
tonal calls [are] emitted in the presence of a leopard, low-pitched staccato grunts [are]
made when an eagle [is] seen, and high-pitched chutters [are] emitted if a snake [is]
detected" (Roberts 361-362). The responses to these symbolic calls are very specific.
For the leopard can, the response is to climb high into the trees. The monkeys scan the
skies and run into the bush when the eagle call is given. In the instance of the snake call,
the monkeys coalesce on the located snake in a mob-like fashion in order to subdue the
predator (362).
In studies of vervet monkeys, these calls have been recorded and played back.
This is due to the claim that the calls themselves are not symbolic or semantic in nature,
but rather instinct and behavior mimicry that create the situations that seem to be
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symbolic exchanges. According to this argument, one vervet monkey sees a leopard,
screams, and then runs to the tree tops to avoid predation, and the rest simply follow by
example. In the playback tests, however, the sound was emitted by a speaker-system
near a group of monkeys. The monkeys all responded to each distinct call in the
predicted way, even in the absence of either a calling monkey to mimic or an actual
predator. It is thus the sound that contains the message that elicited the reaction (362).
From an Austinian point of view, the symbolic reference vocalized by the
monkeys was a locutionary act. The warning created and the promise of eminent danger
conveyed was an illocutionary act. The perlocutionary perspective can be seen from the
designed response that the particular calls elicited. More to the point, within each of
these perspectives these various examples all support the idea that animals engage in
symbolic communication. The question of whether they truly use symbols, however, is a
question that requires further discussion. The term "use" seems to carry the baggage of
intention. Thus, to prove that animals are symbol using one must prove the capacity for
use, or intention, i.e. cognitive ability and consciousness.
The existence of animal consciousness or cognitive ability is difficult to prove. It
is not something that definitional logic or an interesting anecdote can point to as a logical
necessity. Consciousness is not something that is provable. The search for infallible
proof that animals are conscious and have cognitive capabilities illuminates the fact that
we cannot even prove that humans are conscious with cognitive capabilities. This is
because "we are always on the inside [of our own skins] and can know about other '1' s
only from the outside of their skins" (Dawkins 1). For instance, if another human has a
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headache and expresses that he or she has a headache, one may not know whether the
individual is truly experiencing a headache. Although the individual claiming to have the
headache may be exhibiting the same physical reaction to what one observing would
consider a headache, one can never be sure that the person claiming to have a headache is
actually feeling or experiencing that which we call a headache, nor that they are truly
conscious of such, for perhaps they are just going through the motions by "instinct." As
Dawkins states, "We can know what we experience on the inside of our own skins but
our knowledge of experiences inside other bodies is strictly limited. The study of
consciousness in other animals would therefore seem doomed to fail" (10).
Despite the seeming impossibility of proof, we all continue with our lives as
though it were completely possible to know what is inside another person's head. We
make jokes to ease a friend's distress, we avoid hostile people, and we comfort the sad.
In our actions that presume to know what is logicaily impossible to know (another's
consciousness) we often find adequate results. Often, our jokes do ease the distress and
the sad are uplifted by our comfort. This seems to point inductively to the fact that we
are able to discern consciousness in another, as we react accordingly. This is done by
two processes. The first process is by using our set of experiences to predict that other
individual's experiences play out similarly to ours. The second process qualifies the first,
as it takes into accOlmt the patiicular circmnstances surrounding another's experience,
including the differences between theirs and ours (Dawkins 11). We are thus able both to
discern and to act in accordance with another's consciousness and cognitive ability.
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In the case of animals this seems possible as well. The difference between
utilizing our abilities of discernment with humans and with animals is that there are
biological and situational differences between the two. However, Dawkins seems to
address this poignantly:
If we look beyond the skin, beyond whether the animal lives in the sea or
flies through the air, to the animal's own world, we find similarities that
are at first not obvious at all. If we put aside the fact that, say, a particular
animal carries out many of its social interactions through a system of
sounds that are incomprehensible to us and concentrate instead on what
the sounds tell it about fellow members of its species and on the insights it
seems to have about what they will do next, again, we see analogies where
previously we saw none. (12)
Let us then examine some situations of animals that will allow us to come to the
conclusion that animals are conscious. Before we do, however, we must be aware of the
tendency to anthropomorphize animal experiences and project onto their situations what
we think the human experience is. This calls into play the second of the processes,
whereby we must be conscious ofthe differences between "us" and "them." However,
just as we can use the situation's unique attributes in conjunction with our own to predict
other human actions and reactions with high success, the use of such has proven quite
successful in the animal kingdom, and thus anthropomorphism can be avoided or even
proven inconsequential. Even the most ardent arguers against anthropomorphism, such
as Jolm S. Kennedy, concede that it is a useful and successful way of predicting behavior,
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and thus of attributing the existence of consciousness to non-human animals (Masson
36).
The existence of conscious non-human animals with cognitive ability is hard to
prove if all actions seem to fit a rote instinctual model. hlstinctual actions simply geared
towards seif-preservation, or innatehmlearnt behavior definiteiy exists in animals, but not
all behavior is as such (Dawkins 21). Instances defying self preservation thus seem to
point to a higher level of cognitive ability and consciousness, or at least enough to fulfill
our point. For instance, a pair of peregrine falcons, Arthur and Jenny, were successfully
parenting their five fledglings. Jenny, however, did not appear one day, and Arthur's
behavior changed dramatically. For the first two days of disappearance, he attended to
the five fledglings meagerly, and continued to call for his mate throughout the day. On
the third day Jenny was missing, Arthur uttered a sound he had not made before. Marcy
Houle, the biologist observing the falcons described it as "a cry like the screeching moan
of a wounded aninlal, the cry of a creature in suffering [ ... ] the sadness in the outcry was
m1illistakable; having heard it, I will never doubt that an animal can suffer emotions that
we humans think belong to our species alone" (qtd. in Masson 91). The fourth day was
then spent with Arthur motionless on a nearby rock. The fifth day was full of intense
hunting, bringing food to the fledglings. Arthur's actions later became more moderated.
Biologists noted that three of the fledglings had died, while two had survived and fledged
successfully (92). The actions ofthe falcon, however, had seemingly no connections
with seif preservation, but rather had negative consequences on the species as a whole, as
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three of the fledglings died. TIllS is an instance of an animal acting outside of normal
instinctual or preservation oriented bounds.
Elephants often act in ways that suggest more than merely an instinctual
existence. They often exhibit signs of grief and memory, as demonstrated by their
interactions with elephant bones (Masson 95-96). While elephant graveyards do not
actually exist, elephants nonetheless have a demonstrable fascination with bones of their
own species. When they find them, they will inspect them thoroughly and often carry
them for miles. Elephants, however, never demonstrate tIlls same interest in bones of
another species. Researcher of African elephants, CyntIlla Moss, once took the jaw of a
dead elephant mother of a nearby elephant family back to her camp for study. A few
weeks later, the family wondered near the camp and made a mat'ked detour to the jaw.
The herd moved on, but the seven-year-old calf ofthe dead elephant stayed on long after
the herd. The calf continuously touched the jaw, tunllng it over with its feet and trunk.
The conclusion that Moss came to was that the intricacies of the jaw triggered a memory
in the calf, calling up perhaps cognitions of grief and memory of the past mother (96).
TIlls situation held no survival imperative or instinctual guide to govern the actions. A
calfleaving the herd of elephants is actually antithetical to elephant survival behavior.
The actions are thus more indicative of cognitive ability by way of the seenling signs of
grief and memory capacity.
Not only do instances of grief point towards non-instinctual action, and thus
consciousness and cognitive ability, but instances of perceived pleasure do as well. Two
male dolpIllns at an oceanarium were unusually tame towards each other compared to the
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normal interaction between males. One, however, was taken to another exhibit at the
oceanarium for three weeks. Upon return, the two filled the tank with movement,
jumping out of the water and dashing about. They then spent the next several days
'"playing" with one another, ignoring the rest of the dolphins (Masson 115-116).
Other animals have been noted to simply enjoy their surroundings for no purpose.
Before recorded distress calls and tame falcons were used to scare them off, crows
inhabited the areas around the gold leaf domes of the Kremlin. The crows were
purposefully scared off because of damage they were causing. They had found it to be
enjoyable to slide down the onion-shaped domes for no apparent purpose, their claws
doing great damage to the domes in the process. Additionally, bears have been seen
sliding down snow banks like otters. Other bears have been seen floating in mountain
lakes, where they stick their noses under water to blow bubbles and then use their claws
to pop the bubbles. Bears have even been seen wrestling for logs, the winner of the tout
being rewarded by the ability to lay on its back, juggling the log with its feet and roaring
(Masson 125-127).
While these instances of "joyful activities" do not necessarily point to any point
of cognitive abilities or consciousness, they point to a plausibility of the conclusion that
there is more at work than merely an instinctual existence. From a survival standpoint
there is no reasonable or direct explanation for the crows sliding on the Kremlin domes.
The rule of parsimony sides with an enjoyment theory more than a theory saying that this
band of crows was participating in an instinctual activity that would heighten their
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survivability ratio: "The layperson ... [and] most people who work closely with
animals ... take it as a matter of fact that animals have emotions" (Masson 3).
COlmtless anecdotal instances would support such a statement. Gorillas that mate
for life have died by the side of their faiien mates instead of running for their own safety,
thereby exhibiting what we would can grief, sorrow, and love. Elephants have been seen
to risk their own lives to support and carry off a fallen and dying sibling (Masson 91-97).
The existence of animal "emotions" thus seems to be a decent indicator of their
consciousness, as "[human] emotions provide us with perhaps the most vivid of our
conscious experiences" (Dawkins 141).
Additionally, it should not be that difficult for an individual to accept that animals
can "think" as their brains are often greatly developed, many times resembling human
physiology. Often, however, individuals create the view that animals are "stupid."
Anecdotal tales are told of "dumb" animals behaving in ways lower than the expectations
of a human. Thus, animals must all be dumb. Burke himself utilizes such an example
when he uses the example of a bird trying aimlessly to get out of a room through the
ceiling when a window was open only a few feet away. Dawkins explains:
A stumbling block that many people have when they look at animals is
that they see their behavior as being the opposite of clever and complex.
In fact, they see animals as essentially stupid. They will use examples like
a bird fighting its own reflection in a mirror and say that this shows that
the bird is very unintelligent because it apparently never realizes that there
is not a real rival there. Or they point to a dog turning round and round on
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a carpet before it lies down and say that this, too, is stupid because the dog
does not realize that the grass it is attempting to flatten is nonexistent.
Their implication is, of course, that humans could never behave in such
mindless, unthinking ways. (21)
This stream of argumentation, however, seems to ignore the unthinking actions of
human beings - the drinking while driving, the abandoning of the family for an internet
relationship, the starting of wars for political gain, the owning of slaves, or the supporting
of a dictatorial regime. These are not situations in which humans recognize the
"obvious" and are thus prime material for anecdotes analogous to the bird and the
window.
This now brings us back to our original refutation of the first of Burke's clauses.
If animals have the cognitive ability to be conscious, have memories, and assess their
situations, and then utilize specific signs in specific contexts, then it seems erroneous to
say that "Man is the symbol using animal" [italics added], as there are other symbol using
animals.
Burke, however, attempts to include qualifications so as to save his clause from
arguers such as myself. He does so by allowing the amendment of "symbol-making and
symbol-misusing" to the first clause.
Burke does not do much to defend symbol-making's place in the definition nor
the implications of this amendment. However, in terms of the production of symbols,
animals participate in such to varying degrees. Dolphins, for instance, have a complex
system of clicks, whistles, and other sounds inaudible to the human ear. These sounds
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have been noted to be taught to the young dolphins, usually during the first twenty
months that the dolphin spends with its mother before being weaned (Evans 132). The
vervet monkeys we spoke of earlier often give false or misguided warning calls when
they are young, sounding calls that mean nothing or that signal the wrong action for the
predator nearby. As they get older, they must learn the correct cries from the rest ofthe
troop (Roberts 362). Chimps being studied have been shown to be able to report back to
the group what an experimenter has shown them. If food was shown to a chimp, the rest
of the group comes running into the cage after interacting with the original chimp. If a
snake is shown to the chimp and then hidden in the open cage, the group will come into
the cage after interacting with the original chimp, but will be on alert in the cage, hair
standing on end (Davis 174-176). Other studies using monkeys have shown great
capacity for primates to learn sign language, even to the point of phraseology. Examples
such as "open food drink" were signed by a chimpanzee when a refrigerator was present,
"listen dog" was signed when a dog barked, and "cold rock" was signed after handling an
ice cube (Roberts 363-365).
While these examples are not instances in which the animals "made" the symbols
per se, they prove the ability of the animals both to learn symbols and to pass them down
to others in the group. This is enough to refute the exclusivity of this portion of the
Burkean clause, for there is no grounding in the argument that humans invented
language, but rather we have learned it and reshape it in different ways. As animal
communication develops naturally as they exist in nature, so too does human
communication have transcendent natural development that crosses culture. For instance,
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crying, laughing, smiling, and other conmmnicative acts are culturally and historically
transcendent. The communication is then honed and manipulated by particular sects of
humanity. Animals too reshape language and contrive it in their own ways, as shown
before. For instance, crickets end up with different dialects in the way they
commlmicate. New Jersey crickets have a regional accent compared to those of South
Dakota, and given a chance, crickets will on average mate with those who have similar
dialects (Davis 114-117). Additionally, for song birds, competition for mating and
territory creates an "arms race" in certain scenarios for the development and learning of
new songs (Owings 147).
The final portion of the clause is that of the symbol-misuse. There are several
implications and ways that Burke extrapolates on this point. The first is that symbols can
give us a false sense of reality and change our reactions simply because of their symbolic
stronghold. Burke uses the example of an anthropologist who ate dumplings but had
thought they were simply blubber and thus got sick, even though he liked dumplings (7).
Animals too operate in this way. Animals mock each other, mimicking actions to change
the behavior of others, and the other animals respond in kind, because the symbol is
deliberately misleading.
Additionaily, Burke goes on to say that substitution and condensation occur in our
human use of symbols. This, however, assumes that animals do not use symbols, for if
they do, then their symbols are merely encoded versions of a message, which is truly the
form of a larger message. Burke explains the way it plays out in humans by using the
example of calling someone Mr. Jones, thus "cutting many comers, as regards the
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particularities of that particular person" (8). However, Owings goes so far as to say that
animals operate in a manager and assessor relationship, in which the managers cut
comers as needed to fit their end, which is capitulation by the assessors. The assessors
then act in accordance with both the manager and other factors to make a decision of
whether to obey (55-63). The animals are peliorming, or doing, in their communication
(Austin 6). Additionaily, if we conclude that animals use symbols consciously to convey
meaning, then their symbols are inherently cutting comers as well, for there is an infinite
regress in the particulars that the animals could utter. It is never possible to tell all the
particularities of Mr. Jones, as mathematically one could continuously divide the
particularities into further particularities and thus the description would never end. The
symbolic nature of animal communication would fit just the same, as a directive to leave
one's territory could be described infinitely by further communication.
This brings us then to exactly the point. Burke's first clause in his definition of
Man is not exclusiv~, but at best is the beginning of a discussion on the degrees to which
individual species of animals use, make, and misuse symbols. Perhaps the songbirds
have a much more limited usage for symbolic communication compared to the vervet
monkeys and their need for specific cries; perhaps the vervet monkeys are not as
advanced in their language structure as humans are. This, however, does not make for a
definition, but rather a point of comparison and analysis. Animals, like humans, have the
capacity that is exhibited by some to communicate consciously and symbolically.
For many, though, this string of anecdotal evidence and piecemeal argumentation
may be accepted but unappreciated. Many would wonder why we should even care about
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animals and their symbolic communication capabilities. There are a couple reasons,
however, that this work has importance and relevance in many realms of communication
theory.
First, it lays the groundwork for further exploration. To go deeper into the
subject, one must have the "conscious symbolic commlmication" gamut out of the way.
This paper hopefully allows for that, at least on some level. This means that further work
into the subject matter is possible, including a refutation of the rest of Burke's clauses.
Specifically, exploration into how animals use the negative, are separatedfrom their
natural condition, engage in a spirit of hierarchy, and seek perfection are all possible
after this point (Burke 9-16).
Second, this study begins the process of opening up the more theoretical fields of
communication to that of the animal world. The technical and biological aspects of
animal communications open the floodgates for studies in the arts of persuasion, rhetoric,
dialectic, and the sorts in regards to non-human species. Studies on how chimpanzees lie,
dolphins comfort, or birds persuade are all given more theoretical backing for further
studies by communication theorists. The rhetoricians, however, is not able to analyze the
rhetoric within the life of an ape if it is not first understood that these animals consciously
communicate symbolically. TIns thesis is a first step.
As a first step, though, the rationale for this study is not to say that upon reading
and agreeing with these few pages that one can truly "analyze the rhetoric within the life
of an ape" without problems. Unquestionably, the study of the languages of animals, in
their various forms, is necessary to proceed.
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This is not to say though that this work is only communicatively relevant as it
pertains to future works. Communication theory relies on many underpinnings. Studies
of these underpimlings thus implicate the larger schemes of communication theory. We
often fool ourselves into thinking that we must use ancient terminology coined by the
classics in order to tmly study communication theory. On the contrary, the study of the
various underpinnings is the study of a piece of the communicative puzzle. Whether this
study takes on the guise of an analysis of what Aristotle meant by dialectic or analysis of
the vervet monkeys' ability to ever be considered in the realm of dialectic, the study of
communication is still inexorably linked to rhetoric. No one would discOlmt Burke's
writings on Man's ability to communicate as relevant to communication theory. It seems
absurd then to discount a work on animals' ability to communicate as relevant.
Regarding current analysis of this issue, biologists undertake these endeavors at
varying rates (Friend 1-4). The study of animal communication should have both those
that are experts in animals and those that are experts in communication working together.
There is a noticeable disparity in the number of communication theories and studies
being undertaken by those in the "communication field" compared to those that are doing
so in the animal field. Hopefully, works such as this are the first step.
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